Africa is at a cusp of a blood filled or a bloodless wonder. It could strap her of what the future really holds or be an indication of what the past foretold.
Claude Lambert gives some depth with his personal thoughts on this.
Coup Déjà Vu
Each coup is unique, making it difficult to determine the exact causes of the “coup wave” spreading across West Africa and the Sahel. However, scholars generally agree on commonalities driving coups, including poverty, political instability, systemic corruption, violent extremism, and the dilemmas of democratic development.
Recent global shocks such as the 2019 coronavirus pandemic, climate change, and world economic downturn further intensify Africa’s problems. Also, some countries in the region have fallen victim to the “coup trap,” in which once a coup has occurred, the risk of further such events is much more likely.
Historically, Africans often viewed coups negatively because they were seen to halt democratization, spark violence, and create more dysfunction. But today, unconstitutional military takeovers, particularly in the coup belt, appear to enjoy popular support. That said, this widespread support for coup plotters is often short-lived and largely driven by dissatisfaction, resentment, and frustration amongst citizens with their elected leaders and deteriorating socio-economic conditions.
Moreover, the recent withdrawal of French and European troops, who had been at the forefront of counter-terrorism efforts in the region, coincides with the emergence of private military companies. These companies, operating with less transparency and accountability, may exacerbate the existing security vacuum. Simultaneously, the “reckless exploitation of natural resources” by external actors and corrupt local leaders threatens the region’s stability.
This volatile combination is likely to foster increased instability, potentially leading to more coup attempts. Furthermore, such circumstances could inadvertently strengthen populist support for regimes that emerge in the aftermath of these coups.
Furthermore, it appears the coup leaders in the Sahel are learning from and supporting each other. In fact, the military putschists of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea recognize each other as potential allies and know that they can rely on the support of other juntas in the region.
The result of all these factors is a post-2020 roadmap to executing a successful coup: bide time to withstand international pressure, blame regional blocs or foreign colonial powers, and build partnerships with like-minded allies. Eventually, the international community will become preoccupied with other pressing security challenges and fail to act decisively against the unlawful government takeover.
Waiting for a Western Response
So, what is the international community doing to stem this proliferation of coups? Unfortunately, not much. Instead, competition for influence and security partnerships in Africa between the United States, Russia, and China prevails over policies to punish or manage post-coup governments.
Specifically, Western nations are selective in their response to coups, often turning a blind eye to those that do not serve their interests. For more than two months, the U.S. delayedformally declaring the military ouster of Niger’s democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, a coup d’état, prioritizing instead the country’s critical role in supporting U.S. counter-terrorism activities in the region. This undermines U.S. efforts to reverse democratic backsliding and harms its long-term national interests in Africa.
Senior U.S. administration officials said they finally acted on openly announcing a formal coup declaration only after exhausting all diplomatic avenues to preserve constitutional order in the West African nation. Sadly, this is too little, too late. When Western countries fail to act swiftly against unlawful seizures of power, it weakens the taboo against coups.
Similarly, regional organizations such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States are hesitant to enforce their anti-coup rules when powerful member states experience coups. Mauritania, Egypt, Chad, and Sudan, for example, escaped sanctions while Burkina Faso, Niger, and others became targets for Western outcry. The regional blocs once had a satisfactory record in deterring and reversing coups. In 2017, the Economic Community of West African States deployed troops to The Gambia to force the country’s dictator, Yahya Jammeh, to step down and leave the country after he lost the election. Now, however, it appears to be weak, divided, and lacking the capacity to deal with democratic overthrows that arise in the region.
During the 2023 Nigerien constitutional crisis, the group threatened to use force to restore democracy, but the threat proved hollow — letting its ultimatum expire without taking action.
Conversely, the military governments in Burkina Faso and Mali announced they would send troops in support of the Niger junta if the Economic Community of West African States intervened militarily. To solidify their ill-gotten gains and further shield themselves from possible threats of armed rebellion or external aggression, the three putschist regimes agreed to form the Alliance of Sahel States. This mutual defense pact binds the signatories to assist one another emphasizing, “any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more contracted parties will be considered an aggression against the other parties.” In late 2023, the three Sahel nations met to legitimize and strengthen this political, security, and potentially economic alliance.
On Jan. 28, 2024, the military leaders issued a joint statement announcing they are withdrawing from the Economic Community of West African States “without delay,” because they said it imposed “inhumane” sanctions on their nations. So, it seems the three junta-led governments are confident in the strength of their new alliance and are advancing the concept of military rule as a solution to poor security and bad governance in the region.
Then there are the middle-tier powers such as Turkey, which recently expanded defense and military cooperation with post-coup states like Burkina Faso and Mali and is reportedly exploring closer military ties with Niger’s junta. Turkey has established itself as an important arms supplier throughout the region, reshaping conflicts in Mali and Chad with its military technology and training. Alongside Turkey, Gulf powers are also getting involved in Africa, with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia supporting opposing groups in Sudan’s genocidal civil war.
The Emiratis purportedly provides the Rapid Support Forces, a Sudanese paramilitary group, with military weapons and materiel via Chad, despite a longstanding U.N. arms embargo on Darfur. These actions by middle-tier powers undermine Western anti-coup efforts and make isolating putschist regimes more difficult.
– Claude A. Lambert is a U.S. Army strategic plans and policy officer. He is a U.S. Army War College fellow serving as a visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army War College, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
