Pelumi Abiara and Samuel Ayoola combined to pitch their thoughts on this…
It has dominated the media space recently, with many asking, will Crystal Palace be thrown out of the UEFA Europa League for the 2025/2026 season or will they be allowed to participate?
The team qualified on merit, why is this even a question? Unfortunately for Club Leon though , they were removed from the Club World Cup after failing to comply with the governing body’s rules on multi-club ownership.
The landscape of professional football is rapidly evolving, with the multi-club ownership (MCO) model emerging as a prominent, if sometimes contentious, trend. While the concept of a single entity owning multiple football clubs isn’t entirely new, its prevalence has exploded in recent years. Let’s get into the complexities of this modern phenomenon, exploring both its potential benefits and the significant concerns it raises, particularly through the lens of recent high-profile cases like Nottingham Forest and Crystal Palace.
Background check into Multi Club Ownership
Historically, MCOs existed but rarely commanded the spotlight they do today. A notable early example is the Pozzo family, who by 2009 owned Udinese (Italy), Watford (England), and Granada (Spain). While their model was innovative at the time, its execution faced challenges, with both Granada and Watford often struggling to maintain stability within the top divisions of their respective leagues before Granada was sold in 2016.
Overtime, prominent examples of successful MCOs include the:
– City Football Group (CFG) boasts Manchester City (England), Girona (Spain), Melbourne City (Australia), and New York City FC (USA), among others.
– INEOS owns minority stake and sporting control in Manchester Utd (England), and complete ownership of Nice (France) – though reportedly looking to sell.
– Red Bull Group operates a highly successful football model with RB Salzburg (Austria), RB Leipzig (Germany), RB Bragantino (Brazil), and New York Red Bulls (USA).
– Eagle Football Holdings Limited includes Botafogo (Brazil), Olympique Lyonnais (France), and Crystal Palace (England).
– Evangelos Marinakis’s empire encompasses Nottingham Forest (England), Rio Ave (Portugal), and Olympiacos (Greece).
– The Friedkin Group owns Everton (England) and AS Roma (Italy).
– Bill Foley’s portfolio includes Bournemouth (England) and a minority stake in Lorient (France)
The question remains, if two clubs within the same MCO qualify for the same competition – as in the case above as we had in Manchester City/Girona, Manchester United Nice – how can a single owner genuinely wish for both teams to win when they play each other?
In the 2024/25 season, UEFA’s Club Financial Control Body (CFCB) accepted the admission of Girona FC and Manchester City FC to the Champions League as well as Manchester United FC and OGC Nice to the Europa League following the implementation of significant changes by the concerned investors in Girona FC and OGC Nice.
In particular, the concerned investors have transferred their shares in Girona FC and OGC Nice to independent trustees through a blind trust structure established under the supervision of the CFCB First Chamber. Such blind trust was accepted by the CFCB First Chamber on an exceptional basis for the season’s UEFA competitions. The trustees were expected to regularly exchange information with the CFCB First Chamber during the said season.
As a result, the following applied at the level of Girona FC and OGC Nice for the 2024/25 season:
• the effective control and decision-making of these clubs rest solely under control of the trustee;
• following the resignation of its board members, the investor is no longer represented on the board of directors and has no capacity to directly appoint new directors to the board;
• the trustee appointed the new directors to the board;
• the investors have no ability to influence sporting related decisions;
• the investors have no ability to influence the club through veto rights or contractual arrangements entered into with other shareholders;
• the investors are restricted in their ability to provide subsequent financing;
• the club’s financial statements will be deconsolidated from the investors’ holding company.
Furthermore, as additional evidence of their independence, the concerned clubs committed to the following:
• the clubs will not transfer players to each other, whether permanently or on loan, directly or indirectly, from July 2024 until September 2025, with the exception of pre-existing transfer agreements that had been entered into before the opening of the CFCB proceedings;
• the clubs will not conclude any kind of cooperation, joint technical or commercial agreements between each other; and
• the clubs will not use any joint scouting or player database.
Crystal Palace’s FA Cup win this year qualified them for the 2025/2026 Europa League, but investor John Textor (43% Palace, Lyon owner) triggered objections from Nottingham Forest (via letter to UEFA). Forest argued Textor’s influence breached rules, especially after UEFA’s March 1 ownership-change deadline passed.
The contentious issues: Integrity, Identity, and Inequality
A major concern has been the threat to Sporting Integrity which the Crystal Palace/Lyon conflict exemplifies.
There are worries that MCO will also potentially encourage player hoarding. MCOs, particularly those with vast networks, could sign a large number of young players, moving them between clubs in the group. While this offers diverse experience, it can also lead to talented players being hoarded, denied consistent playing time, or shunted around without a clear development pathway, ultimately stunting their growth.
Some critics further argue that internal transactions between sister clubs (e.g., inflated sponsorship deals from a common holding company, player transfers at non-market rates) could be used to circumvent FFP regulations, giving an unfair advantage to clubs within the MCO like it has been suggested within the ClearLake Group (Chelsea and Strasbourg)
We have also had cases of financial Distortions “Feeder Club” Dynamics that has sparked fears that Smaller clubs risk losing identity. Girona fans protested when CFG prioritized Manchester City’s interests pre-blind trust . Watford and Udinese fans accused the Pozzo family of treating clubs as interchangeable assets. Moreso, Gérard López’s tenure with Lille, a revered French club that won Ligue 1 in 2020/2021, was marred by financial controversy, nearly leading to bankruptcy. López’s subsequent ventures with Bordeaux (France), Boavista (Portugal), and Royal Excel Mouscron (Belgium) have drawn significant criticism from fans.
The Case FOR Multi-Club Models: Benefits & Opportunities
Wealthy owners can inject capital into smaller clubs, particularly those in less affluent leagues, improving infrastructure, youth academies, and overall club operations. This can rescue financially distressed clubs and provide them with a more stable future. For example, Textor’s Eagle Football rescued Botafogo from financial struggles
MCOs can create a global scouting network, identifying and developing talent from diverse regions. Players can be moved between clubs within the group (often on loan or at agreed valuations) to gain varied experience and accelerate their development, potentially offering pathways that single clubs might not be able to provide. Typical of this is the relationship of Chelsea with Strasbourg
City Football Group has operated an exemplary successful MCO and while Manchester City remains its crown jewel, CFG’s investment and strategic oversight have profoundly impacted Girona, often receiving promising young players on loan or as transfers. This synergy has been instrumental in Girona’s meteoric rise, culminating in their historic qualification for the UEFA Champions League.
The Future: Regulation, Equity, and Your Perspective
The multi-club model is unequivocally here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. While it is neither inherently good nor bad its impact hinges on governance quality and regulatory enforcement.
However, the rapid expansion and varied ethical standards among owners demand a proactive and robust response from governing bodies.
Therefore, there is a compelling argument for more stringent regulations on multi-club ownership. Specifically, clearer and more enforceable rules are needed regarding the degree of ownership stake and influence an entity can have over clubs within the same continent.
The future lies in stricter continent-specific ownership caps, aligning with UEFA’s tightening of “decisive influence” tests – perhaps, a 30–49% “non-control” threshold as a pragmatic limit. The Global football fraternity must also work hand in glove to harmonize MCO rules across confederations to prevent loopholes. This is paramount to avoiding situations where a deserving team is denied the chance to play in continental competitions due to a conflict of interest.
The selling club largely determines at what cost they will let go of a player under contract, however as much as possible, transparent player valuations must be attempted, and ensuring that every club, regardless of its place in an MCO, operates with its own competitive spirit, mandating public disclosure of intra-group transactions and fan base as its primary concern.
Football, unlike any other business, thrives on the passionate connection between fans and their clubs, and on the inherent integrity of competition. Without treating “talent” (players) and “fans” with the respect they deserve, the spectacle and awesome atmosphere that define the game could diminish.
The future of football’s integrity rests on finding these delicate balances.
We also patiently await UEFA’s verdict over Crystal Palace ahead of the Europa League’s draw for the upcoming season.
This article was put together by Pelumi Abiara & Samuel Ayoola
